Introduction
After predatory financial markets dismembered Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008, investors took refuge in US Treasuries. The rich returns to US sovereign bonds, however, were not evenly distributed across the market. Prices of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), for which the principal and interest payments are indexed to the CPI, fell dramatically as their nominal counterparts rose in value. Near-term "breakeven" or "expected" inflation, which is the difference between nominal and real yields, plummeted to −6.5%.
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The autumn 2008 divergence between TIPS and nominal Treasuries was unusual: the correlation between these asset classes has historically hovered around 0.9, but fell to a low of 0.4 in November 2008. Investors stress their portfolios to analyze the impact of extreme events, which tend to lie outside the purview of statistical risk measures. Stress tests can detect a portfolio's vulnerabilities and assess its expected reaction to market scenarios, and consequently can add significant value to an investment process. However, it can be challenging to determine and implement the most salient scenarios. Furthermore, the output of many stress tests is expressed in terms of profit and loss (P&L), and this information is not directly actionable. The investor must translate P&L into modified portfolio weights.
The divergence was also impactful, since TIPS account for roughly 10% of the US sovereign bond market, representing hundreds of billions of dollars in outstanding principal. Even after the fact, backward-looking statistical risk models are unfit to assess the likelihood of a dramatic shock to breakeven inflation. It is nevertheless possible to account for a shock of this type in an investment process.
In this article, we address both of these issues. First, we introduce a structured set of tools that enable investors to envision and administer extreme historical and hypothetical scenarios. We show how to take account of historical and hypothetical covariance matrices in scenario construction, and we provide examples that demonstrate the substantial impact of doing so. In short, the risk climate can and should be incorporated in a stress test.
Second, we provide a means to incorporate the output of a portfolio stress test directly into an investment decision, which ultimately boils down to a tradeoff between the competing objectives of minimizing risk and maximizing return. In the examples provided below, we achieve this with a scenario-constrained mean-variance optimization. However, as discussed in Cases 4 and 5, we can incorporate extreme risk and other non-Gaussian effects in a stress test. Below, we review the standard framework for stress testing a portfolio. Subsequently, we sketch our new paradigm and provide numerous examples that illustrate its features. 1 Inflation rates in the US have been overwhelmingly positive over the past century. The lowest inflation rates, roughly −5%, occurred in the mid-1920s and again in the mid-1930s. Since 1950, the rate of inflation has not fallen below 1%. The low level of breakeven inflation in autumn 2008 may be attributed to market-wide fears of a 1929-style deflation. 
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The unconditional means [ ] E X and [ ] E Y depend on the particular assets and factors in question, the time horizon for the shock, and the details of the ambient economic regime. They can be specified as part of the stress test, and for simplicity, we set them to zero in the examples below. As such, the expected shock to , X conditional on a shock to , Y depends only on the magnitude of the direct shock and the covariance matrix . Σ Suppose the US Equity Market, , Y loses 10%. Using Formula (1), the expected P&L of , X say nominal US Treasuries, is the covariance of US Equities and nominal US Treasuries ( XY Σ ) divided by the variance of the US Equity Market ( YY Σ ), multiplied by the −10% shock magnitude. In other words, the implied P&L of nominal US Treasuries is the beta of nominal US Treasuries to Equities multiplied by −0.1.
The simplicity of the calculation stems from the fact that we directly shocked a single asset class. In the case of a multivariate shock, the calculation of the expected P&L is more complicated. In essence, the set Using an EWMA covariance matrix with a 21-day half-life estimated on September 9, 2009, the annualized daily covariance of US Equities with nominal US Treasuries is −49.0% 2 , while the annualized daily variance of US Equities is 391.3% 2 . The P&L implied for nominal US Treasuries is thus (−49.0/391.3) * (−0.10) = 1.25%.
X of asset classes that we want to stress is projected onto the set of shocked asset classesY , and the coefficients from this multivariate regression are used in tandem with the shock magnitude to reflect the forecast profit or loss to each asset class in X . Note that the forecast P&L depends only on the covariance matrix and the shocks, and it is independent of portfolio weights. This is an essential property for our inclusion of forecast P&L estimates into the asset allocation problem. Following standard practice, we apply a shock to specific asset classes, and we infer the impact on other asset classes using Formula (1). Note however, that Formula (1) relies on a covariance matrix. So, in addition to explicit asset class shocks, we shock correlations between asset classes and asset class volatility levels as part of stress scenario generation. Through a series of examples, we analyze the impact of changes to a covariance matrix on P&L, and we show how to modify weights to optimally mitigate the effect of the shock. In the last two examples, we broaden the concept of risk to include non-Gaussian effects that are not fully explained by a covariance matrix, and we demonstrate a substantial impact on P&L. Throughout this paper, we define a scenario as the combination of a risk forecast with a set of explicit asset class shocks.
Our examples are based on the problem of allocating assets in a stressful situation. We develop two schematic scenarios. The first is an extreme deflationary scenario that is motivated by the autumn 2008 divergence of Nominal Treasuries and TIPS. Modifying an Asset Allocation to Account for Stress Specifically, we posit a 5% profit to Nominal Treasuries accompanied by a 5% loss to TIPS. The second is an extreme inflationary scenario, in which the value of a nominal investment decays, but an inflation adjusted investment is protected. Our inflationary shock is represented by a 5% profit to TIPS and a 5% loss to Nominal Treasuries.
Consider a plan for which the current allocation is given below. We use market indices to represent the six asset classes in the allocation; they are listed in Exhibit A3 of Appendix B. Our stress testing framework enables investors to both analyze the impact of scenarios on the plan and to modify the weights of the asset classes to take account of the impact. The framework for using forecast scenarios to perturb an existing asset allocation decision is a 3-step process.
• Specify the Scenario: Establish a forecast covariance matrix to represent the risk climate.(In our Gaussian examples, the risk climate is described fully by a covariance matrix, while in our more general empirical framework a covariance matrix is used in conjunction with additional information.) Explicitly shock a subset of the asset classes, and using the 4 A recent history of breakeven inflation is described in Appendix D and shown in Exhibit A12-A14.
In Cases 4 and 5, a non-Gaussian, empirically based method is used to infer X from Y .
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Incorporating a Risk Climate in a Stress Test
Extreme events occur in both high-and low-volatility regimes, and the impact of an extreme event on a portfolio depends on the regime. In the examples below, we include a regime, or risk climate in a scenario, and illustrate the impact of doing so. Our initial examples feature a Gaussian framework, where risk is wholly defined by a covariance matrix and there is an implicit assumption of normality. However, with the incorporation of additional historical information, our methods extend naturally beyond the Gaussian distribution. Our final two examples illustrate how non-Gaussian extensions might work. Consider the deflationary and inflationary scenarios described above. In the deflationary scenario, TIPS fall by 5% and Nominal Treasuries increase by 5% and in the inflationary scenario, the directions of the shocks are reversed. Exhibit 3 shows these explicit shocks, as well as the Formula (1) implicit shocks to other asset classes under the stable covariance regime described above. Also in Exhibit 3 are the reverse optimization implied alphas---these are the asset class expected returns that make the plan's existing weights optimal given the stable covariance regime and a risk aversion parameter of 0.0075 8 . The reader may notice that the implicit shocks for the inflationary scenario are equal in magnitude but of opposite sign to those for the deflationary scenario. This is a direct function of the symmetry in our choice of explicit shocks to represent these extreme economic scenarios. 9 8 A value of 0.0075 is arbitrarily selected as a risk aversion coefficient for this analysis. Note that because the mean variance objective function in our framework is based on implied alphas, which themselves are a function of risk aversion and serve as a peg to the initial allocation, the value of the risk aversion coefficient does not impact optimal weights. It is well-understood that asset class volatilities are not stationary, and dramatic changes in asset class correlations and spikes in asset class volatility are pervasive during market crises (see Appendix A, Exhibit A2). An illustration of correlation matrices generated using a 21-day halflife It is straightforward to create risk models that range in responsiveness by generating current covariance matrices using a variety of half-lives. However, if a manager believes that markets are on the precipice of a crisis, it may be prudent to go back in history to find a consistent covariance-matrix forecast. For example, a manager who believes that the US economy is on the brink of a prolonged period of disinflation might wish to impart this view to his asset allocation in the context of a stressed covariance matrix taken from a disinflationary historical period.
The financial crisis of 2008 spawned a disinflationary regime that led to deflation. To assess how asset class returns may behave during a period of disinflation or deflation, a manager can either construct a covariance matrix from an equally weighted sample of observations from relevant historical periods or take a historical, exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) covariance matrix using an analysis date from the relevant regime. We take the latter approach
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We re-examine the deflationary scenario defined in Case 1, but now analyze its impact using the responsive risk forecast described above. As expected, the scenario-implied profits and losses are much larger in magnitude in a crisis risk climate than in an average one. Notably, combining the explicit deflationary asset-class shock with a crisis risk climate leads to a sharp increase in allocation to government bonds-an unmistakable flight to quality. The crisis covariance matrix, with both its heightened asset class volatilities and extreme correlations, implies substantially larger losses and leads to a greater allocation to Nominal Treasuries, even at moderate loss levels. These results are summarized in Exhibits 5 and 6 below: Case 3: Allocating Assets in a Hypothetical Risk Climate
We have seen that using historical risk climates may be more relevant to anticipated market behavior than a long-term average. We now show how to create hypothetical risk climates that fall outside the range of historical experience. Following Bender, Lee, and Stefek (2010), we can manipulate asset class correlations to reflect a manager's view. This is accomplished by introducing a latent risk driver, which selectively raises or lowers correlations between targeted asset classes without compromising the statistical integrity of the correlation matrix.
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For illustration, consider a stable forecast estimated from 10 years of equally weighted data as of November 20, 2008 . Just at that time, Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 12 was beginning to take effect, and some investors may have been concerned that inflation, not deflation, was on the horizon. Further, some may have believed that the (unstable) negative correlation between Equities and Nominal Treasuries that pervaded the early 2000s would not persist in the future, and assumed instead that the correlation between these two asset classes would revert to levels realized in the 1980s and mid-1990s of around 0.4. Modification of a correlation matrix can undermine its positive semi-definiteness, thereby making it unfit for statistical applications. In the framework outlined in Bender, Lee, and Stefek (2010) , all asset class correlation adjustments are based on asset exposures to a latent variable. This procedure, maintains the positive semi-definiteness of the correlation matrix.
12 TARP is a US Government program intended to strengthen the financial sector through the purchase of so-called troubled assets. The program was signed into law by President George W Bush on October 3, 2008.
13 Bekaert et al. (2010) Subtler effects, including an increased allocation to REITs, which showed a loss in this scenario, and a decreased allocation to Commodities, which are a standard inflation hedge, require deeper analysis. The explanation for these allocations lies in the implied alphas obtained through reverse optimization. Up to a constant of proportionality, implied alphas are marginal contributions of asset classes to portfolio volatility, and each marginal contribution is the product of the volatility of the asset class and its correlation with the portfolio . The impact on the allocation decision can be seen by comparing the scenario-implied profits and losses in Exhibit 8, as well as allocations at various maximum loss levels in Exhibit 9. In the inflationary scenario based on the modified correlation matrix, the allocation to TIPS increases while the allocation to Equities decreases as the loss constraint tightens. As expected in an inflationary environment, Nominal Treasuries are eschewed.
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To illustrate the impact of the initial allocation, we retain the inflationary scenario described by the manipulated November 20, 2008 stable asset class correlation matrix, but now begin with an equally weighted allocation to the six asset classes. Exhibit 10 provides a comparison of implied alphas under the original and alternate initial allocations. In the alternate (equally weighted) allocation, the implied alpha for Equities is substantially lower, due to the reduction in correlation to the aggregate portfolio resulting from the reduced weight. A knock-on effect lowers the implied alpha for REITs, while the implied alpha for Commodities is higher. Exhibit 11 shows the dependence of perturbed allocations on the loss constraint using the equally weighted initial allocation. There is less tendency toward REITs and greater tendency toward Commodities than in the same scenario with the original initial allocation. Because of its profound impact on perturbed allocations, it is important to consider the initial allocation in the context of the scenario being defined.
. Thus, the initial allocation affects the implied alphas. In our example, the REITs implied alpha is significantly larger than the Commodities implied alpha.
14 Bender, Lee and Stefek 's framework introduces a parameter νi to control the exposure of asset class i to a latent risk driver or unobservable source of commonality. They then use the following expression to manipulate the correlation between asset classes i and j,: Davis and Menchero (2010) illustrate that the marginal contribution to portfolio risk of a given source, traditionally defined as the partial derivative of portfolio volatility with respect to a change in source weight, can be intuitively expressed as the volatility of the source times the correlation of the source returns with the portfolio returns. Case 4: Allocating Assets using Empirically Defined Shocks
In the previous examples, risk was determined by a covariance matrix, which was used to infer implicit asset class shocks from a specified explicit shock via the multivariate framework in Formula (1). Underlying this methodology is the assumption that asset class returns follow a Gaussian distribution. However, it is the tail scenarios, where traditional normality assumptions break down, that may be most relevant to stress testing. Accordingly, we broaden our scenario derivation process to take account of empirically observed extreme events.
An alternative to the Gaussian approach underlying Formula (1) is to define asset class profit and loss as the expected value of the return of that asset class, conditional on the explicit shocks exceeding a threshold. To forecast meaningfully the behavior of asset classes in the presence of shocks, we use a deep data history, and we apply the Barra Extreme Risk (BxR) methodology developed in Goldberg et al.
.
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For example, a 3% loss in a single day may have been disastrous in May 2006, but it was relatively benign in October 2008. Therefore, we can create a more empirically grounded (and non-Gaussian) profit and loss scenario by scaling historical returns to a desired covariance climate. The expected value of each normalized asset class return, conditional on the shocked variables exceeding a specified threshold, is estimated directly from the rescaled data series, without making parametric assumptions.
It is important to highlight that while our empirical approach makes no parametric assumption about BxR recognizes that asset class volatility is non-stationary, so that the magnitude of an "extreme" return depends on the risk climate. 16 As documented in Dubikovsky et al. (2010) the expected P&L for a given scenario, the estimate is based upon re-scaled historical returns that are directly impacted by a covariance-defined risk climate. Importantly, the magnitude of rescaled returns, and hence of asset class expected profit and loss, depends critically upon the covariance climate chosen. Exhibit 12 displays the asset class profits and losses for a scenario whereby TIPS fall by 3%, and Nominal Treasuries simultaneously rise by 1%.
First, we derive the returns in the Gaussian framework from Formula (1) using a 21-day EWMA covariance matrix as of November 20, 2008. Second, we use the empirically defined approach described above, using the November 20, 2008 21-day EWMA covariance matrix as the climate for re-scaling. Specifically, we estimate the expected value as of November 20, 2008 of each asset class, conditional on both (covariance-scaled) Nominal Treasuries rising by at least 1% and (covariance-scaled) TIPS falling by 3%, over the entire history of observations. The profits and losses vary substantially between these two approaches. In particular, the empirical approach, which is more sensitive to extreme events, returns a substantially larger loss for REITs and High Yield Bonds than does the Gaussian distribution. This leads to a dramatic difference in perturbed allocations as shown in Exhibit 13. In our final example, we explore the impact that extreme risk climate asset allocation might have had in the darkest moments of the financial crisis. We emphasize the differences that stem from using empirical-versus Gaussian-implied shocks. Note that the examples presented below serve only as illustrations and do not constitute a thorough statistical evaluation.
By June 2008, market participants had weathered a year of high volatility and unprecedented extreme events. Some may have sought a relatively conservative investment strategy that would perform well in a flight-to-quality. Consider a hypothetical flight-to-quality risk climate with volatility, say, at three times the level observed at the end of June 2008. Further, we assume relatively high correlation across the five riskier asset classes, and will specify this assumption by supposing all are pairwise correlated at .7. Finally, we assume that the traditional safe haven, Nominal Treasuries, moves in the opposite direction from riskier asset classes with a correlation coefficient of -0.3.
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We retain the deflationary shock used in Case 4, a 1% increase in Nominal Treasuries and a 3% decline in TIPS, and show in Exhibit 15, the implied asset class profits and losses under the Gaussian and empirical models using the hypothetical risk climate. Note that while they are a function of the same risk climate, the implied loss to Equities is much greater under the empirical model than under the Gaussian model, empirically suggesting that Equities may exhibit tails that are heavier than that which is implied by the Gaussian distribution. The corresponding perturbed asset allocations are shown in Exhibit 16. The shocks implied by the empirical approach lead to modifications of the initial asset allocation under weaker loss constraints. Under tighter constraints, the Gaussian model allocates almost completely to Nominal Treasuries, while the empirical model allocation is largely a split between Nominal Treasuries and Commodities. In Exhibit 17, we examine the performance of the asset allocations over the turbulent six-month period from June to December 2008. Since the 6% loss constraint produced by the Gaussian model was not binding, it left the initial allocation untouched and resulted in a return of -25%. The empirical model generated a binding constraint that moved assets from Equities, REITS and High Yield Bonds to TIPS, Commodities and Nominal Treasuries. The result was a better performance at -19%. The 4% loss constraint was binding for both models, and resulted in returns of -25% for the Gaussian model and -17% for the empirical model. When losses were more tightly constrained to 2% or 0%, the empirical model underperformed the Gaussian, which concentrated assets in the only class that performed well during the period from June through December 2008.
It turns out that investors who were able to accurately envision the November 20, 2008 risk climate in June 2008 would have been in a fortuitous position. Even without precise knowledge of the future asset class returns, those who could accurately forecast the covariance regime prevailing through the fall of 2008, would have been poised to benefit substantially. We examined the performance of the perturbed allocations displayed in Exhibit 13 for the six-month period extending from June through December 2008. These allocations were generated by using the Gaussian and empirical models calibrated to the November 20, 2008 crisis covariance matrix to generate shocks to all asset classes based on a 1% increase in Nominal Treasuries and a 3% decrease in TIPS. As shown in Exhibit 18, the empirical model outperformed the Gaussian model at all levels of loss constraint, and both models outperformed the initial allocation whenever the constraint was binding. 
Conclusion
While it may not be possible to precisely measure the likelihood of an extreme event, it is nevertheless a valuable exercise to assess its impact on a portfolio. In this article, we introduced a new paradigm for translating extreme events into asset-class scenarios. An essential point is that the risk climate plays an integral role in the translation. Even within a Gaussian framework, a wide range of risk climates can be obtained from history by varying the analysis date and the responsiveness of covariance matrix estimation. Furthermore, any historical covariance matrix can be modified to reflect exogenous views on future correlations via the introduction of a latent factor, which can represent a flight to quality, a change in liquidity, or another transient effect that disrupts markets in a crisis. Importantly, the latent factor preserves positive semi-definiteness, and hence the essential statistical character of the covariance matrix. More broadly, risk climates can be empirically specified in terms of expected values of asset classes in an extreme situation. Anecdotally, implicit shocks generated by empirical distributions tend to be larger than the Gaussian analogs. A more systematic analysis is a topic for future research.
A second contribution made in this Research Insight is a quantitative method to modify asset allocation weights in a stress scenario. A scenario-constrained optimization using reverse-optimized alphas modifies an initial asset allocation in intuitive and conservative ways. It is important to highlight the flexibility of the approach outlined here. The quadratic formulation outlined in Formula (2) can easily be modified to include additional constraints (such as bounds on weights or portfolio turnover) in order to make the results more applicable to an individual's existing allocation process. It can also be expanded to include a constraint or penalty for extreme risk, as discussed in Bender, et al (2010) and Goldberg, et al (2011) .
Whether used in combination or alone, these contributions are material extensions of the standard stress testing methodology and they can provide investors of all types with valuable input to their decisions. Exhibits A12 and A13 show US nominal and real interest rate term structures on a series of dates at sixmonth intervals. The earliest curve shown, July 7, 2007, predates the recent crisis and indicates flat nominal and real rates at roughly 5% and 3%, respectively. Later in July, however, troubles at two Bear Stearns hedge funds specializing in subprime mortgages became public, setting off market disruptions that foreshadowed the crisis that followed. The market responded with a flight to quality. Rates dropped by roughly 2% at the short end and 0.5% at the long end, leaving an upwardly sloping yield curve as of January 4, 2008.
In the first half of 2008, increased commodity and oil prices led to a bout of inflation that troubled consumers in the form of increasing prices for gasoline, shipping, and air travel. In March, Bear Stearns was sold to JP Morgan at a fire-sale price. Markets were volatile, nominal interest rates held steady, and real interest rates dropped at the short end. Autumn 2008 witnessed the unprecedented deflationary shock featured in this article. The Lehman Brothers collapse triggered a dramatic flight to nominal US Treasuries, and TIPS were eschewed along with equities, REITS, commodities, and other risky securities. 
